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THE GLOBAL FIELD OF MULTI-FAMILY OFFICES: AN INSTITUTIONALIST 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We apply the notion of the organisational field to internationally operating multi-family offices. 
These organisations specialise on the preservation of enterprising and geographically dispersed 
families’ fortunes. They provide their services across generations and countries. Based on 
secondary data of Bloomberg’s Top 50 Family Offices, we show that they constitute a global 
organisational field that comprises two clusters of homogeneity. Clients may decide between two 
different configurations of activities, depending on their preferences regarding asset management, 
resource management, family management, and service architecture. The findings also reveal that 
multi-family offices make relatively similar value propositions all over the world. The 
distinctiveness of the clusters within the field is not driven by the embeddedness of the multi-
family offices in different national environments or their various degrees of international 
experience. Rather, it is weakly affected by two out of four possible value propositions, namely 
the exclusiveness and the transparency of services.  
 
 
Keywords: multi-family office, financial services, wealth management, organisational field, 
business model 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of the organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is one of the most influential 
theoretical concepts in management research and continues to be important (Greenwood and 
Meyer, 2008). Most empirical studies on organisational fields have selected the industry as unit 
of analysis. We follow the definition of industry “as a set of forces that are engaged in the same 
line of business and that are widely recognized as constituting a sphere of activity” (Hambrick et 
al, 2005, p. 317) and analyse the organisational field of multi-family offices on a global level.  
Wealthy families in the Americas, Europe and Asia are often served by specialised institutions: a 
single-family office provides services to a blood-related family, whereas a multi-family office 
may serve multiple, unrelated families. Multi-family offices are particularly popular because, 
first, single-family offices often alter themselves into multi-family offices over time because of 
the growing number of family members and their increasingly complex demands (Decker and 
Lange, 2013; Rosplock, 2014). Second, many companies from different segments in the financial 
services industry diversify into the potentially lucrative business with wealthy families (Hauser, 
2001; Rosplock and Hauser, 2014). Third, there is an increasing geographic dispersion and 
internationalization of the families and their businesses, associated with the need for advice from 
each jurisdiction where the individual members live (Lowenhaupt, 2008; Rosplock and Hauser, 
2014; Welsh et al, 2013).  
Organisational fields are predominantly studied within national borders, although they are not 
theoretically restricted to them (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007). Internationally operating multi-
family offices provide the unique opportunity to explore the existence and characteristics of an 
organisational field that transcends national borders. Hence our first research question is: do 
global organisational fields exist? To provide an answer, we apply the criteria originally 
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suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and show that there is indeed a global field of multi-
family offices.  
There is a controversial debate whether organisational fields, as they mature, are characterised by 
uniform homogeneity in forms and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or by heterogeneity 
on the field level and homogeneity on the level of sub-fields (Quirke, 2013). This leads us to our 
second research question: if a global organisational field of multi-family offices exists, is it 
dominated by homogeneity or do distinct clusters within this field exist? Drawing on the business 
model-concept, our analyses of Bloomberg’s Top 50 Family Offices (2012) reveal two clusters.  
To the extent that a global organisational field is characterised by clusters of homogeneity, 
different factors may drive their distinctiveness, such as the embeddedness in national 
environments (Casper and Hancké, 1999) or the degree of international experience (Guler and 
Guillén, 2010). Thus, our third research question is: which factors are driving cluster 
distinctiveness? Our empirical analysis rules out the aforementioned factors as driving forces of 
cluster distinctiveness. Only two value propositions –exclusiveness and transparency – weakly 
drive cluster distinctiveness.  
From a theoretical perspective, the study is important because it is still unclear whether global 
organisational fields exist that are characterised by a high level of homogeneity. From a 
practitioner perspective, the study is relevant because it sheds light on the question of whether or 
not the value propositions of multi-family offices that are located in different regions need to be 
tailored to the cultural environments in which they are embedded. Our finding that multi-family 
offices make relatively similar value propositions all over the world holds important implications 
for managers of multi-family offices and their clients.  
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Organisational Fields 
In their seminal contribution, DiMaggio and Powell ask, “What makes organizations so similar?” 
(1983, p. 147). They argue that organisational forms in modern society are surprisingly 
homogeneous, particularly within an organisational field. The latter is “a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148). 
DiMaggio and Powell claim that “once a field becomes well established, however, there is an 
inexorable push towards homogenization” (1983, p. 148) due to isomorphic pressures. Despite 
being old, DiMaggio and Powell’s concept is still highly influential (Greenwood and Meyer, 
2008). Nonetheless, the extant literature has neither explored the possible existence of global 
organisational fields nor analysed empirically whether global organisational fields – if they exist 
– are homogeneous, as predicted by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), or rather heterogeneous, as 
predicted by proponents of national business systems (e.g., Whitley, 1999).  
Actually, organisational fields often show significant heterogeneity and comprise distinct clusters 
of homogeneous organisations as an outcome of a weak regulatory environment, multiple 
institutional logics within a field, and changing environmental demands to which actors must 
respond (Quirke, 2013). In this respect, evidence by Casper and Hancké (1999) on the global 
diffusion of the quality management system ISO 9000 in the automobile industry in France and 
Germany is instructive. Their key finding is that this new organisational model has been 
implemented in different ways, because of different national institutional settings – such as 
industrial relations – in these two countries. Given that the objects of our study – globally 
operating multi-family offices – are headquartered in different continents, a global segmentation 
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due to different institutional logics and environmental demands (macro-level factors) is possible 
(Hassan et al, 2003).  
International experience might also drive a segmentation of organisational fields. Guler and 
Guillén (2010), referring to the cross-border expansion of U.S.-based venture capital companies, 
reveal that past international experience might lead to learning and a subsequent adjustment of 
strategies. Multi-family offices that have accumulated international experience may have adopted 
organisational forms and activities that differ from those adopted by competitors that focus on the 
domestic market or have just started to internationalise. From a marketing perspective, this idea is 
similar to the initial premise in segmenting markets “that the market is not entirely 
homogeneous” (Beane and Ennis, 1987, p. 20), even if it is global in nature. Put differently, the 
aforementioned theoretical traditions focus on “the two indispensable global strategy ends of 
standardization and adaptation” (Hassan et al, 2003, p. 446).  
Business Models of Multi-Family Offices 
A business model explains and specifies activity systems consisting of design elements and value 
propositions (or design themes) (Morris et al, 2005; Zott and Amit, 2010; Zott et al, 2011). We 
adjust this concept to the family office-context.  
Turning to the design elements, first, activity content describes what activities family offices 
perform (Zott and Amit, 2010). Family offices provide services that span both the family and the 
business domains, such as wealth management, family business assistance, asset management or 
real estate (Beaverstock et al, 2013; Decker and Lange, 2013; Wessel et al, 2014). Second, 
activity structure describes how the activities are linked (Zott and Amit, 2010). Many client 
families, especially those with globally dispersed members and a variety of entrepreneurial 
activities, prefer a structure that captures a client family’s needs in their entirety. Other clients use 
their family offices for selected services such as asset management or real estate only, requiring a 
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specialised activity structure that focuses on a well-defined area of expertise (Hauser, 2001; 
Lowenhaupt, 2008). Third, activity governance specifies who is involved in creating and 
performing the services (Zott and Amit, 2010). Family offices are strongly affected by the 
families they serve (Welsh et al, 2013). Their involvement in activity governance is important. 
Organisations can put more or less emphasis on each of these design elements and combine them 
into different configurations.  
Design themes act as value propositions within these configurations (Zott and Amit, 2007, 2010). 
Clients usually value various aspects of the activities performed (Maas and Graf, 2008). The 
exclusiveness of the services is central. Many clients aim at preserving their wealth for 
subsequent generations (Beaverstock et al, 2013). Thus, they appreciate a family office’s long-
term orientation of the relationship with its clients and its experience in serving wealthy families 
over generations. Because of the increasing complexity of financial products and the global 
dispersion of families, complementarities and efficiency are created by the corporate structure in 
which family offices are embedded and the transparency of activities (Decker and Lange, 2013). 
Client families whose members are geographically dispersed may benefit from the global 
presence of family offices, because it bears the potential of a broader knowledge base, for 
example, referring to taxation or inheritance law (Lowenhaupt, 2008).  
 
METHODS 
Capturing Features of Organisational Fields  
Referring to the first research question, we explored the extent to which multi-family offices 
emerge as a global organisational field by applying the four criteria established by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983, p. 148):  
2015FSM00152.R1 
6 
“an increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field, the emergence of sharply defined 
interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition, an increase in the information load with 
which organizations in the field must contend, and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in 
a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise.”  
To our knowledge, there is no established instrument to measure these criteria. We observed and 
scanned the content of the international media coverage of family offices and described salient 
debates. For instance, we retrieved information published by FOX Family Office Exchange, 
Hubbis or Capgemini. We also observed blogs revealing developments in the financial services 
industry and websites of national regulators, such as the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) in the U.S., the BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) in 
Germany, the Agency for the Development of the Financial Centre in Luxembourg, or the FIDC 
(Dubai International Financial Centre). The analysis of information from different countries is 
crucial to avoid distortion.  
Assessing Business Models  
For the second and third research question, we focused on the websites of the multi-family 
offices included in Bloomberg’s list of the Top 50 Family Offices worldwide of the year 2012 
(see Appendix). We collected data by codifying the offline copies of the official corporate 
websites as of April 2, 2013. Available online information has also been used by previous studies 
in the financial services industry (e.g., Bravo et al, 2012; Waite and Harrison, 2002). If both 
country characteristics and client responsiveness variables are important for global segmentation 
(Hassan and Craft, 2012), the business models of the selected multi-family offices will reflect 
them and reveal similarities and differences.  
Our newly developed coding scheme integrates the literatures on organisational fields and 
business models (e.g., George and Bock, 2011; Morris et al, 2005; Quirke, 2013; Sorescu et al, 
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2011; Zott and Amit, 2007) and conversations with managers and owners of family offices. Three 
independent coders content-analysed all websites.  
Design elements. We built three formative indices (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001) that 
reflected different dimensions of activity content. They can be described as asset management 
(covering, for instance, estate management, risk management and asset protection), resource 
management (including, for example, asset control, lifestyle administration and human capital 
development), and family management (consisting of, for example, family business assistance, 
family governance and philanthropic advisory).  
Referring to the activity structure, we assessed whether the observed multi-family offices pursued 
a holistic or a specialised approach. We scanned the websites for expressions such as “holistic 
service offering”, “integrated services”, or “full range of services”. When we did not find any of 
these expressions, we based our coding on the number and types of services provided. When a 
multi-family office explicitly stated that it only offered a special type of services, we defined this 
as a specialised activity structure.  
Based on the descriptions on the websites, we also assessed whether or not the client families 
were explicitly involved in activity governance.  
Design themes. We measured experience by defining age categories. We split the family offices 
at the median value (21.50 years) and specified two categories, with 1 = high experience (above 
the median age) and 0 = low experience. Exclusiveness is given, if a multi-family office serves a 
selected type of client families. One of the most important criteria for being a client of a family 
office is the required amount of assets under management. Many family offices define new client 
minimum thresholds (Decker and Lange, 2013). We assert a high exclusiveness if the required 
new client minimum of assets exceeds 20 million USD. We assessed whether a multi-family 
office favoured a long-term relationship with its clients, if this was explicitly stated on its website 
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(for example, “maintaining long-term client relationships” or “We focus on the long-term”). The 
corporate structure can create value, because a multi-family office being part of a financial 
holding company implies that a client possibly has more options to make financial investments 
based on a broader range of financial products. Hence, we assessed whether or not a multi-family 
office was part of a holding company. Multi-family offices that have international offices beyond 
their home continent may be better able to create value for geographically dispersed and multi-
jurisdictional client families than those that mainly operate on a single continent. We also tested 
the influence of national embeddedness, i.e., whether a multi-family office is headquartered in 
North America or other continents. Finally, client efficiency is created by transparency in the 
exchange of information between the multi-family office and its client families. We assessed 
whether the observed multi-family offices explicitly stated frequent reporting to their clients.  
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics and the correlations among the customer 
responsiveness and macro-level variables used to assess the business models.  
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
RESULTS 
Multi-Family Offices as a Global Organisational Field 
Referring to the four criteria established by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), we find that, first, there 
has been a significant increase in the extent of interaction among organisations, particularly 
through associations and meetings. The FOX Family Office Exchange, for instance, is a global 
network which serves the needs of wealthy families and their advisers. FOX has established nine 
councils in which well-matched peers work together on a common task such as managing a 
multi-national and multi-generational family office (FOX Global Family Council, established in 
2005) or the challenges of multi-family offices (FOX Multi-Family Office Council, established in 
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2006). FOX organises multi-day conferences and workshops, offers webinars and online peer 
discussion groups, and disseminates research findings. Other important meeting places are, for 
instance, the Financial Times Family Office Forum or the Asian Family Office Forum; the latter 
forum includes international and Asian family offices, family businesses, entrepreneurs and 
family advisers. Apart from the management of family assets, important issues are how to 
prepare the next generation for leadership, strengthen family cohesion or engage in philanthropy. 
Interaction among family offices also occurs through co-investments. The Society of Family 
Offices Asia, for instance, was created as a platform for co-investment (Hubbis, 2013).  
Second, interorganizational patterns of coalition among family offices are discernible, especially 
with regard to regulation. A case in point was the concerted action, directed at the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, family offices undertook in late 2012 to free them from the 
requirement to register as Commodity Pool Operators. Mariann Mihailidis, who oversees the 
FOX member councils, expressed this openly in a blog:  
“This is one more example of how family offices working together can influence the outcome of regulation 
in Washington. We congratulate the Private Investor Coalition and all of the family offices who wrote 
letters on achieving the desired outcome” (Mihailidis, 2013).  
This comment shows that competing family offices are well-aware of the importance of 
collective action for influencing regulators in their favour. This behaviour of orienting actions 
toward each other is typical for a population of actors constituting an organisational field 
(Beckert, 2010). The fact that Mihailidis’ website states that “Mariann worked in one of 
America’s leading family offices for four years” (Family Office Exchange, 2013) also indicates 
inter-organisational structures of domination. Furthermore, the fact that regulators, such as the 
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) in the U.S., the BaFin (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) in Germany, the Agency for the Development of the Financial 
Centre in Luxembourg, or the FIDC (Dubai International Financial Centre), have developed 
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their own definitions of types of family offices, has also had an influence on the emergence of 
patterns of coalition.  
Third, family offices face an increase in the information load with which they must contend. Key 
trends are summarised in the Capgemini Industry Report (2012). First, family offices have to 
cope with more regulation. Second, rich families and individuals are demanding increasingly 
complex financial services in a broad range of areas (e.g., precious metals or farmland). This is, 
third, fuelled by the emergence of new asset classes. Fourth, families are becoming more globally 
dispersed than ever (Lowenhaupt, 2008). As a result, family offices are expected to manage 
investments in foreign countries and conduct cross-border transactions. This necessitates the 
knowledge of different legal and taxation systems (Gapgemini, 2012). According to William 
Chan, the founder and CEO of the Asian Family Office Stamford Privee, this is particularly 
relevant for Asian families:  
“A typical family tree poses a lot of cross border issues – that’s heightened in Asia, where many wealthy 
families send their children to study in the U.S. or the UK, for example, and the children end up settling 
overseas, getting married and pursuing careers there. This creates various issues around succession and 
transferring wealth” (Hubbis, 2013).  
Fourth, the existence of the yearly Bloomberg Top 50 ranking demonstrates that there is a mutual 
awareness among organisations of this type. There are strong indications that family offices are 
involved in a “common enterprise”, namely providing (ultra-)wealthy, entrepreneurial families 
with independent investment and other advice. The key word is “open architecture”. Advisers 
select products from a range of providers and are not allowed to push the products of their own 
institutions, a practice many large banks have been accused of in the wake of the financial crisis. 
This has nurtured the growth of multi-family offices (Decker and Lange, 2013).  
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Homogeneity or Heterogeneity within a Global Organisational Field 
Cluster analysis was used to assess whether the combination of and emphasis put on design 
elements leads to heterogeneity among multi-family offices (Hair et al, 1998; Ketchen and 
Shook, 1996). Two clusters emerged, comprising 37 (Cluster 1) and 13 multi-family offices 
(Cluster 2).  
--- Table 2 about here --- 
We tested the impact of the design elements on the likelihood of whether a multi-family office 
belongs to a certain cluster with MANOVA (Luo et al, 2011). Table 2 shows the cluster means, 
standard errors, and the relative level of emphasis given to the design elements within each 
cluster. Wilk’s lambda MANOVA omnibus test was significant (F(5, 44) = 28.518, p = 0.000)). 
There are differences in two out of three design elements, namely in all dimensions of activity 
content and in activity structure. Specifically, the multi-family offices in Cluster 1 put more 
emphasis on asset management, resource management, family management (activity content) and 
holistic service architecture (activity structure) than those in Cluster 2. The difference between 
the clusters based on family involvement in activity governance is not significant. This finding 
reflects that the active involvement of client families, that is typical for single-family offices, is 
not part of the usual business model of a multi-family office (Rosplock, 2014).  
Cluster Distinctiveness 
The regional base of the multi-family offices does not differ significantly; 86.5 percent of the 
family offices in Cluster 1 and 84.6 percent of their counterparts in Cluster 2 are headquartered in 
the U.S. This is only a small difference, which becomes even less pertinent if we consider that 
HSBC Private Wealth Solutions, which is in Cluster 1 and by far the largest of the Top 50 family 
offices, is headquartered in Hong Kong and not in the U.S., and only has offices in the Asian 
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region. The national origin of the multi-family offices does not seem to drive the differences 
between the two clusters.  
--- Table 3 about here --- 
We conducted MANCOVA to explore similarities and differences in more detail (Luo et al, 
2011). Wilk’s lambda omnibus MANCOVA test was not significant (F (7, 40) = 1.738, p = 
0.128). The results reported in Table 3 show that only the differences in the emphasis put on 
transparency in the interaction with the clients and the required minimum of assets that new 
clients must bring in (exclusiveness) are marginally significant value propositions. Neither 
experience nor long-term relationships nor corporate structure significantly drives cluster 
distinctiveness. The multi-family offices in both clusters put low emphasis on global presence 
(international offices). They are predominantly headquartered in North America, indicating that 
there are no differences between the clusters referring to international orientation and national 
embeddedness.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for Research 
First, this study sheds light on the activities that multi-family offices perform for their clients. 
Due to the cross-sectional character of the data, the specification of trends is limited, but a 
qualitative assessment of the two clusters is nonetheless revealing. Multi-family offices of Cluster 
1 have been longer in existence; they have more assets under management, a higher number of 
employees, more offices beyond the home continent and serve more multi-generational families 
than those of Cluster 2. Multi-family offices of Cluster 2 have a significantly higher number of 
offices. This is surprising given that family offices of Cluster 1 are, on average, larger in all 
respects. Possibly, the smaller and younger family offices of Cluster 2 try to gain ground against 
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the more established organisations of Cluster 1 by having more offices (especially in their home 
continent). This might be an indicator that multi-family offices in Cluster 2 aim at evolving into 
organisations like those included in Cluster 1. . If this development occurred, this would further 
strengthen our claim that a global organisational field of multi-family offices exists that is 
characterized by a substantial level of homogeneity. 
Second, we combine the four criteria specified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in order to assess 
whether a set of economic actors constitutes a global organisational field with the 
interdisciplinary business model-concept (Zott et al, 2010). The application of the four criteria 
and the fact that there is a significant level of homogeneity among the business models of the 
world’s 50 largest multi-family offices shows that a global organisational field is not only a 
theoretical possibility but actually exists. Thus, the notion of organisational fields is also 
applicable to phenomena that transcend national borders.  
Third, against the assumptions of the national business systems-approach, the activities of multi-
family offices are not subject to local adaptations. Although most multi-family offices primarily 
focus on their home region, regional embeddedness does not drive heterogeneity among their 
business models. In this highly specialised industry, globally diffused activities are not “used or 
interpreted in different ways in different societal contexts” (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007, p. 
13). However, caution is necessary concerning generalizability. In other industries, the claim that 
globally diffused activities must be adapted to the local context might find strong support. 
Implications for Practice 
The differences between the clusters are mainly driven by activity systems. Clients may decide 
between different activity systems, depending on their preferences regarding asset management, 
resource management, family management, and service architecture. More specifically, clients 
may choose multi-family offices offering more holistic or specialised activity structures. 
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Financial service providers should be aware of this distinction, because the provision of a holistic 
structure requires significantly more resources than a specialisation on selected activities.  
Marketing practitioners can use the instrument developed in this study to improve brand and 
product positioning (Hassan and Craft, 2012). It can be a starting-point for the development of a 
communication device. The latter may help marketing practitioners to capture the activities of 
their multi-family offices in and across national contexts and explain them to their clients.  
Finally, the result that multi-family offices make relatively similar value propositions all over the 
world holds important implications for managers of multi-family offices. Expanding into other 
world regions without potentially costly adaptations might be a promising strategic option for 
large multi-family offices that currently primarily concentrate on their home region.  
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TABLE 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 asset management 0.933 0.178            
2 resource management 0.693 0.342 0.104            
3 family management  0.700 0.338 0.301* 0.403**            
4 holistic architecture 0.440 0.501 0.259 0.366** 0.393**           
5 family involvement  0.460 0.503 0.121 0.243 0.188 -0.010          
6 experience 0.500 0.505 0.151 -0.039 0.299* -0.161 0.120        
7 exclusiveness 0.220 0.418 -0.073 0.243 0.091 0.210 -0.200 -0.048        
8 long-term relationship 0.620 0.490 0.171 -0.060 0.160 0.030 -0.021 0.206 -0.082       
9 corporate structure 0.320 0.471 0.178 -0.096 0.273 -0.003 0.141 0.343* 0.050 0.007      
10 international offices 0.140 0.351 -0.174 -0.032 0.132 -0.009 -0.141 0.058 0.203 -0.040 -0.153     
11 transparency 0.460 0.503 0.121 0.440** 0.387** 0.152 0.275 0.120 -0.103 0.227 0.055 -0.025    
12 North America 0.860 0.351 -0.044 0.145 0.040 0.125 -0.090 0.173 -0.064 -0.078 0.153 -0.169 -0.090   
13 bank as corporate parent 0.680 0.471 -0.178 -0.115 -0.017 0.090 -0.313* -0.086 -0.153 0.170 -0.449** 0.153 -0.055 0.094 
14 log families 1.886 0.665 0.331* -0.051 0.235 -0.090 0.090 0.336* -0.139 0.151 0.527** -0.012 0.137 0.212 -0.264 
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE TWO CLUSTERS - MANOVA 
 
Design elements Cluster F-values Significance of F 
 Cluster 1 (N = 37) Cluster 2 (N = 13)   
 Mean SD Mean SD   
asset management High  High    
0.991 0.055 0.769 0.285 20.978      0.000*** 
resource management High  Medium    
0.766 0.323 0.487 0.322 7.174  0.010* 
family management  High  Low    
0.856 0.185 0.256 0.277 77.021      0.000*** 
holistic architecture Medium  Low    
0.590 0.498 0.000 0.000 18.304      0.000*** 
family involvement  Medium  Medium    
0.490 0.507 0.380 0.506 0.389 0.536 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3. CLUSTER DISTINCTIVENESS – MANCOVA ACROSS THE TWO IDENTIFIED CLUSTERS 
 
 Cluster F-values Significance of F 
 1 (N = 37) 2 (N = 13)   
Drivers of distinctiveness Mean SD Mean SD   
 Medium  Low to medium    
experience 0.548 0.080 0.362 0.138 1.321 0.256 
 Low  Very low    
exclusiveness 0.290 0.067 0.020 0.115 4.024 0.051+ 
 Medium to high  Medium    
long-term relationship focus 0.689 0.079 0.425 0.135 2.770 0.103 
 Low to medium  Low    
corporate structure 0.362 0.062 0.202 0.107 1.606 0.211 
 Low  Very low    
international offices 0.159 0.059 0.085 0.102 0.394 0.533 
 Medium  Low    
transparency 0.538 0.083 0.238 0.142 3.236 0.079+ 
 Dominant  Dominant    
North America 0.860 0.347 0.850 0.376 0.118 0.733 
Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: bank as a corporate parent = 0.680; log families = 1.886.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10
 
APPENDIX. BLOOMBERG’S TOP 50 FAMILY OFFICES  
Rank Firm Name 
Main office location 
Assets as of 
12/31/10 
In millions 
Assets as of 
12/31/09 
In millions 
Number of 
multi-
generational 
families 
New client 
minimum 
In millions 
1 HSBC PRIVATE WEALTH SOLUTIONS 
Hong Kong 
$102,000 $77,000 235 None 
2 BESSEMER TRUST 
New York 
$44,500 $37,600 2,086 $10 
3 UBS WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
New York 
$34,000 $29,000 250 $100 
4 WILMINGTON FAMILY OFFICE 
(A unit of Wilmington Trust, owned by M&T Bank) 
Wilmington, Delaware 
$26,500 $27,000 309 $10 
5 WELLS FARGO FAMILY WEALTH 
Minneapolis 
$21,000 $21,000 311 $50 
6 HAWTHORN PNC FAMILY WEALTH 
(A unit of PMC Financial) 
Philadelphia 
$19,600 $16,700 500 $20 
7 GENSPRING FAMILY OFFICES 
(Affiliate of SunTrust Banks) 
Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 
$19,538 $18,830 732 $25 
8 GLENMEDE 
Philadelphia 
$19,200 $17,460 1,700 $3 
9 HARRIS MYCFO 
(A unit of Bank of Montreal) 
Palo Alto, California 
$18,258 $17,280 254 $25 
10 NETWORK SERVICES PTE 
Singapore and London 
$17,000 $14,000 5 $50 
11 ATLANTIC TRUST 
(A unit of Invesco) 
Atlanta 
$14,750 $13,268 2,206 $5 
12 OXFORD FINANCIAL GROUP 
Carmel, Indiana 
$10,441 $6,467 76 $2 
13 VERITABLE INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS 
Newtown Square, Pennsylvania 
$10,100 $8,600 181 $20 
14 SILVERCREST ASSET MANAGEMENT GROUP 
New York 
$9,227 $8,815 83 $5 
15 TAG ASSOCIATES 
New York 
$6,700 $6,500 20 $10 
16 BANQUE HERITAGE 
Geneva 
$6,200 $5,600 48 $10 
17 TIEDEMANN WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
New York 
$6,200 $5,600 85 $20 
18 COMMERCE TRUST 
(A unit of Commerce Bancshares) 
St. Louis 
$6,000 $5,200 74 None 
19 BALLENTINE PARTNERS 
Waltham, Massachusetts 
$5,830 $5,341 57 $20 
20 BBR PARTNERS 
New York 
$5,392 $4,099 72 $20 
21 1875 FINANCE 
Geneva 
$4,500 $3,800 3 $5 
22 FEDERAL STREET ADVISORS 
Boston 
$4,158 $3,498 18 $20 
23 CONSTELLATION WEALTH ADVISORS 
New York 
$4,000 $3,800 200 $10 
APPENDIX (continued) 
24 PITCAIRN 
Jenkintown, Pennsylvania 
$4,000 $3,400 43 $25 
25 MARCUARD FAMILY OFFICE 
Zurich 
$3,613 $2,510 43 $30 
26 LAIRD NORTON TYEE 
Seattle 
$3,609 $3,202 399 $10 
27 BAKER STREET ADVISORS 
San Francisco 
$3,600 $3,360 25 $5 
28 ATHENA CAPITAL ADVISORS 
Lincoln, Massachusetts 
$3,521 $3,068 26 $20 
29 CLARFELD FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
Tarrytown, New York 
$3,450 $3,000 275 $5 
30 MONITOR CAPITAL PARTNERS 
Amsterdam 
$2,990 $2,080 70 $20 
31 THRESHOLD GROUP 
Gig Harbor, Washington 
$2,700 $1,560 19 $50 
32 VOGEL CONSULTING 
Brookfield, Wisconsin 
$2,470** $1,992** 24 None 
33 CORNERSTONE ADVISORS 
Bellevue, Washington 
$2,260 $2,013 46 $5 
34 SIGNATURE 
Norfolk, Virginia 
$2,158 $2,088 153 $5 
35 HOMRICH BERG FAMILY OFFICE 
Atlanta 
$2,099 $1,880 30 $20 
36 ARLINGTON FAMILY OFFICES 
Birmingham, Alabama 
$2,000 $1,500 17 $20 
37 PRIVATE CLIENT SERVICES 
Tiburon, California 
$2,000** $500** 4 $100 
38 TAG EISNER 
New York 
$2,000** $2,000** 100 $5 
39 SAVANT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
Rockford, Illinois 
$1,950 $1,583 226 $1 
40 MONACO ASSET MANAGEMENT 
Monaco 
$1,900 $1,500 120 $2 
41 HIGHMOUNT CAPITAL 
New York 
$1,877 $1,558 84 $3 
42 SENTINEL TRUST 
Houston 
$1,700 $1,600 20 $25 
43 BRIGHTON JONES 
Seattle 
$1,685 $1,517 9 $15 
44 KANALY TRUST 
Houston 
$1,640 $1,500 486 $10 
45 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PARTNERS 
Clayton, Missouri 
$1,575 $1,315 70 $10 
46 MERISTEM 
Minnetonka, Minnesota 
$1,550 $1,429 107 Minimum 
annual fee: 
$30,000 
47 BNR PARTNERS 
Chicago 
$1,500** $1,400** 7 Minimum 
annual fee: 
$100,000 
48 CHARLES A. BARRAGATO & CO. 
New York 
$1,500 $1,400 70 $20 
49 MANCHESTER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
Manchester, Vermont 
$1,500 $1,300 35 $25 
50 WMS PARTNERS 
Towson, Maryland 
$1,497 $1,293 21 $20 
** Some or all of the firm’s money is outsourced. Source: Bloomberg 
 
